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Abstract
Monetary growth models in which the government is a net debtor
demonstrate that in￿ ation adversely a⁄ects capital formation through the
crowding out e⁄ect. Interestingly, the results are at odds with empirical
evidence. In particular, recent studies point out to an asymmetric rela-
tionship between in￿ ation and the real economy across countries. Speci￿-
cally, in￿ ation and output are negatively correlated in poor countries. In
contrast, in￿ ation is associated with higher levels of economic activity in
advanced economies. I present a monetary growth model where the ex-
posure to risk is inversely related to the level of income. In this setting,
I demonstrate that the e⁄ects of monetary policy depend on the level of
economic activity and the portfolio composition of ￿nancial institutions.
In poor countries, banks￿portfolios consist primarily of government liabili-
ties. Therefore, a higher rate of money creation inhibits capital formation
in these economies. In contrast, banks devote more resources towards
productive uses in advanced countries. Consequently, monetary policy
generates a Tobin e⁄ect.
JEL Codes: E31, E41, E44, O42
Keywords: Economic Development, Banks, Monetary Policy
1 Introduction
Empirical evidence ￿nds that the long run relationship between in￿ ation and the
real level of economic activity varies across countries. If a signi￿cant correlation
between in￿ ation and economic activity is found, it is generally positive for
￿Department of Economics, One UTSA Circle, University of Texas at San Antonio, San
Antonio, TX 78249; Email: Edgar.Ghossoub@UTSA.edu; Phone: (210) 458-6322.
1advanced economies and negative for poor countries.1;2
Interestingly, monetary growth models with public debt show that in￿ ation
has adverse e⁄ects on capital formation. For instance, in Schreft and Smith
(1997), when the government is a net borrower, a higher rate of money creation
enables it to issue more bonds. The higher amount of debt in the economy
crowds out capital formation in private markets.3 While the channels of opera-
tion of monetary policy are interesting, the results are at odds with the empirical
evidence.
In this paper, I demonstrate that the e⁄ects of monetary policy depend
on the level of income (development) and the distribution of assets in banks￿
portfolios. In particular, if banks￿holdings of government debt and cash reserves
exceed some threshold level, a higher rate of monetary growth adversely a⁄ects
capital formation in poor countries. In contrast, monetary policy generates a
Tobin e⁄ect in high income economies when the amount of government liabilities
occupies a small fraction of banks￿assets.
I proceed by outlining the details of my modeling framework. I consider
a two-period overlapping generations economy with production similar to Di-
amond (1965). There are three types of assets: physical capital, government
bonds, and ￿at money. Following Townsend (1987) and Schreft and Smith
(1997), agents are born on one of two geographically separated locations. If an
individual moves to another location, she cannot establish and trade claims to
assets due to limited communication. Therefore, spatial separation and limited
communication create a role for money. Furthermore, there is a government
that issues illiquid bonds and currency in order to satisfy its budget constraint.
In addition, the monetary authority adopts a constant money growth rule.
In this economy, young individuals are subject to random relocation shocks.
As money is the only asset that can cross locations, relocated agents must
liquidate all their asset holdings into currency. Thus, random relocation is
analogous to the liquidity preference shocks in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). As
a result, the model illustrates the risk pooling role of ￿nancial intermediaries
(or banks).
In contrast to standard random relocation models, and following Ghossoub
and Reed (2009), I assume that the probability of a liquidity shock is inversely
related to the aggregate capital stock. Since income is higher under higher levels
of capital, this assumption re￿ ects the linkages between the level of income and
1Studies that ￿nd a positive relationship between in￿ation and the real economy in ad-
vanced countries include Bullard and Keating (1995), Ahmed and Rogers (2000), and Crosby
and Otto (2000). In a recent study, Rapach (2003) ￿nds a positive long-run correlation be-
tween in￿ation and the real level of output in 14 industrialized countries. While Gillman and
Nakov (2003) ￿nd evidence that in￿ation is negatively correlated with growth in the U.S. and
the U.K., in￿ation and the level of output are positively correlated.
2In the work by Bullard and Keating (1995), the authors ￿nd no relationship between
in￿ation and the level of output for 11 out of 16 countries in group A. For four countries,
Austria, Germany, Finland, and the U.K., they ￿nd evidence of a Tobin e⁄ect. In contrast,
a reverse Tobin-e⁄ect is observed for Peru. Additionally, a recent study by Bae and Ralti
(2000) ￿nds evidence of a reverse Tobin e⁄ect for Argentina and Brazil.
3Schreft and Smith (1998) ￿nd a similar relationship between in￿ation and capital forma-
tion.
2liquidity risk observed in many studies. In particular, previous work indicates
that individuals are more exposed to risk at low levels of income. As a result,
they are more likely to liquidate their asset holdings.4
Under conditions provided in the text, the model predicts there should be
two di⁄erent classes of steady-state equilibria. In one class of steady-states, the
government is a net borrower. In the other class, it is a net lender in ￿nancial
markets. Since governments primarily incur budget de￿cits, I focus most of my
attention on steady-states in which the government issues debt. In this class, I
provide conditions under which two steady-state equilibria exist. In the steady-
state with low level of economic activity, banks allocate a large fraction of their
deposits into government liabilities. Despite that agents are highly exposed to
liquidity risk, they are poorly insured against it. Thus, ￿nancial markets are
highly distorted. The other steady-state has a higher level of capital formation
and agents are less exposed to liquidity risk. Further, it is accompanied by lower
interest rates.
I proceed to discuss the impact of monetary policy on each steady-state. In
this environment, monetary policy a⁄ects the economy through two channels:
The price channel (direct e⁄ect) and the balance sheet channel (indirect e⁄ect).
Each channel has an opposing e⁄ect on the economy. Thus, the net impact of
monetary policy depends on which e⁄ect dominates.
The price channel of monetary policy re￿ ects the direct impact of a change
in the rate of money growth on relative rates of return. In particular, a higher
rate of money growth lowers the return to money and therefore, the bene￿t from
holding it.
In the steady-state with low levels of ￿nancial market activity, the degree
of liquidity risk is signi￿cant. As a result, banks hold highly liquid portfolios
to insure their depositors against relocation shocks. Thus, a higher in￿ ation
rate signi￿cantly reduces the marginal bene￿t from holding cash. In addition,
changes in the stock of capital will generate substantial gains from reducing the
degree of liquidity risk. Rather than holding less cash, banks collectively choose
to reduce their capital investment. By doing so, they raise the value of money
since agents are more likely to relocate.
In contrast to poor countries, the degree of liquidity risk is not signi￿cant
in advanced economies. Because the need for cash is not signi￿cant, the ben-
e￿t from holding money is not signi￿cantly a⁄ected by a higher rate of money
growth. Therefore, banks respond to a lower value of money by holding less of
it and by raising their investment in physical capital.
The balance sheet channel re￿ ects the indirect impact of a change in the
rate of money growth on banks￿balance sheets through the government￿ s bud-
get. For a given rate of interest, a higher rate of money creation enables the
government to increase its indebtedness. The higher amount of debt in the econ-
omy reduces the amount of resources in banks￿portfolios that can be allocated
4Deaton (1991) concludes that households accumulate assets to insure themselves against
income uncertainties. That is, they rely on assets as bu⁄er stocks. Further, at low levels of
income, people might face borrowing constraints. This suggests that low income households
are more likely to liquidate assets in the event of adverse shocks.
3towards physical capital and cash reserves. In addition, a higher amount of debt
implies a higher consumption to agents who do not relocate. Therefore, a lower
cost of holding money.
At the low capital steady-state, banks hold a lot of cash reserves relative
to other assets. Further, ￿nancial markets are highly distorted by high interest
rates. As a result, the cost of holding money (marginal utility of non￿ relocated
agents) is signi￿cant and thus declines sharply when the amount of bonds in
banks￿portfolios rises. Consequently, banks respond to a lower cost of holding
money by collectively choosing to hold more capital to reduce their depositors￿
exposure to risk. By doing so, banks are able to substantially reduce the amount
of money holding in their portfolios. Thus, they can acquire the additional debt
issued by the government without lowering their capital investments.
By comparison, the need to liquidate assets is relatively low in the steady-
state with high levels of capital formation. Consequently, banks allocate a
signi￿cant fraction of their deposits towards long term investments. Moreover,
at high levels of income, the exposure to liquidity risk is relatively una⁄ected
by investment activity. Therefore, banks respond to a higher amount of debt
by reducing capital investment and holding more cash. In these economies,
the balance sheet channel of monetary policy calls for a negative relationship
between the rate of money growth and capital investment.
In sum, agents at di⁄erent levels of income face di⁄erent degrees of exposure
to risk. Hence, they respond di⁄erently to price changes and monetary policy.
As I demonstrate in the text, the net impact of monetary policy at each stage of
development depends on the portfolio composition of ￿nancial intermediaries.
Speci￿cally, if the amount of government liabilities is above some threshold level,
monetary policy adversely a⁄ects capital formation. Notably, the threshold
amount of government liabilities is much higher in poor countries.
The analysis above suggests that the asymmetric relationship between in￿ a-
tion and the real economy observed across countries is explained by the fact that
the price e⁄ect dominates at all levels of income. As I demonstrate in the text,
this occurs when the rate of return to money is relatively low. Intuitively, when
the rate of return to money balances is low, agents receive little consumption in
the event they relocate. The lower consumption by relocated depositors renders
banks￿balance sheets highly sensitive to changes in rates of return. Thus, the
price e⁄ect dominates the balance sheet e⁄ects under a higher rate of money
growth.
This paper complements recent work by Ghossoub and Reed (2008) that
demonstrates how the e⁄ects of monetary policy di⁄er across the stages of de-
velopment. In their work, Ghossoub and Reed (2008) show that the degree of
exposure to liquidity risk at di⁄erent stages of development plays an important
role in the determination of monetary policy. Since government debt plays a
primary factor in the transmission of monetary policy, I view that it is impor-
tant to study how the interaction between di⁄erent markets a⁄ect the conduct
of monetary policy. Interestingly, I show that the distribution of assets in banks
portfolios is also an important determinant of monetary policy at all stages of
development. Monetary policy generates a reverse-Tobin e⁄ect in poor countries
4because banks allocate a large fraction of their deposits towards cash reserves
and government debt. Conversely, a higher rate of money creation is likely to
generate a Tobin e⁄ect in rich countries as long as the amount of government
liabilities in banks portfolios is relatively small.
Finally, the results in this study shed light on current policies in advanced
countries such as Europe and the United States. Speci￿cally, governments in
these economies have been incurring large budget de￿cits in recent years. Com-
bined with very low real interest rates, an in￿ ationary monetary policy could
hinder economic activity in the long run if the amount of government liabilities
in banks￿portfolios are high enough.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I describe the model and
study the impact of monetary policy. I o⁄er concluding remarks in Section 3.
Most of the technical details are presented in the Appendix.
2 Environment
Consider a discrete-time economy with two geographically separated locations
or islands. Each location is populated by an in￿nite sequence of two-period
lived overlapping generations. Let t = 1;2;::1, index time. At the beginning
of each time period, a new generation of individuals is born on each island with
a unit mass.
Each young agent is endowed with one unit of labor e⁄ort which she supplies
inelastically. In contrast, agents are retired when old. Further, agents derive
utility from consuming the economy￿ s single consumption good, c when old.
The preferences of a typical agent are expressed by U(c) = c
1￿￿
1￿￿ .
The consumption good is produced by a representative ￿rm which rents
capital and hires labor from young agents. The production function is denoted
by Yt = F (Kt;Lt), where Kt is the aggregate capital stock and Lt denotes
the amount of labor hired. Equivalently, output per worker is expressed by
yt = f (kt) and satis￿es standard Inada conditions. Further, the capital stock
completely depreciates in the production process.
There are three types of assets in this economy: money (￿at currency),
capital, and government bonds. Denote the per worker nominal monetary base,
capital stock, and real government debt, by ￿ mt, kt, and bt respectively. At the
initial date 0, the generation of old agents at each location is endowed with the
aggregate capital, K0 and money supply, M0. Since the total population size
is equal to one, these variables also represent aggregate values. Moreover, one
unit of investment by a young agent in period t becomes one unit of capital next
period. Equivalently, it units of goods invested become kt+1 units of capital in
the subsequent period.
Assuming that the price level is common across locations, I refer to Pt as
the number of units of currency per unit of goods at time t. Thus, in real terms,
the supply of money per worker is, mt = ￿ mt=Pt.
Moreover, individuals in the economy are subject to relocation shocks. Each
period, a fraction of young agents must move to the other island. These agents
5are called ￿movers.￿Limited communication and spatial separation make trade
di¢ cult between di⁄erent locations. As in standard random relocation models,
￿at money is the only asset that can be carried across islands.5 Furthermore,
currency is universally recognized and cannot be counterfeited ￿ therefore, it
is accepted in both locations.
Since money is the only asset that can cross locations, depositors who learn
they will be relocated will liquidate all their asset holdings into currency. Ran-
dom relocation thus plays the same role that liquidity preference shocks perform
in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). As banks provide insurance against the shocks,
each young depositor will put all of her income in the bank rather than holding
assets directly.
Following recent work by Ghossoub and Reed (2008), the probability of a
liquidity shock, ￿t, is inversely related to the aggregate capital stock. Since
aggregate income is higher under high levels of capital, this assumption serves
as a proxy for the connections between the level of income and liquidity risk.
Speci￿cally, previous studies such as Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) point out
that individuals are more likely to liquidate assets at low levels of income. Hence,
in any time period I assume that:




where ￿0 2 (0;Kt) is a parameter re￿ ecting the degree of liquidity risk inde-
pendent of the economy. From this expression, the probability of relocation is
signi￿cant at low levels of capital formation (income). Moreover, a change in
the capital stock has a signi￿cant impact on the exposure to risk at low levels
of capital.
In addition to depositors, there is a central bank that follows a constant
money growth rule. The aggregate nominal stock of cash in period t is expressed








Pt is the gross rate of return on money balances between period t ￿ 1
and t. In addition to seigniorage revenue, the government adjusts the amount of
new liabilities in order to ￿nance interest payments on previously issued debt.





where Rt￿1 is the gross real interest rate on government bonds issued in period
t￿1. At t = 0, I assume that the government commits to any amount of bonds
(loans) demanded by young agents at the market interest rate. In this manner,
5Because government bonds are issued in large denominations, they are not su¢ ciently
liquid to be used as a medium of exchange.




Under perfect competition in factor markets, factor inputs are paid their mar-
ginal product. The rental rate and wage rates in period t are respectively:
rt = f0 (kt) (4)
wt = w(kt) = f (kt) ￿ ktf0 (kt) (5)
where rt is the gross rental rate on capital in period t.
2.1.2 A typical bank￿ s problem
In this economy, ￿nancial intermediaries arise to insure agents against liquidity
risk. Therefore, agents choose to deposit all of their income at banks. Due to
perfect competition in the banking sector, banks choose portfolios to maximize
the expected utility of each depositor. A bank promises a gross real return
rm
t if the young individual will be relocated and a gross real return rn
t if not.
Moreover, banks take the aggregate capital stock as given. Since the market
for deposits is perfectly competitive, ￿nancial intermediaries take the return on
deposits as given.
The bank￿ s portfolio choice in period t, involves determining the amounts of
real money balances, mt, capital investment, kt+1, and government bonds, bt.
The bank￿ s balance sheet is expressed by:
mt + kt+1 + bt ￿ wt ; t ￿ 0 (6)
Announced deposit returns must satisfy the following constraints. First,
since currency is the only asset that can be transported across locations, relo-
cated agents will choose to liquidate their asset holdings into currency. Depend-
ing on the bank￿ s money holdings and the in￿ ation rate, the return to movers
satis￿es:
￿ (Kt)rm




In addition, I choose to study equilibria in which money is dominated in rate
of return. Therefore, banks will not carry money balances between periods t
and t + 1. The bank￿ s total payments to non-movers are therefore paid out of
its return on capital and government bonds in t + 1:
(1 ￿ ￿ (Kt))rn
t wt ￿ rt+1kt+1 + Rtbt (8)

















In equilibrium, a bank is willing to hold government bonds and capital si-
multaneously as long as they yield the same rate of return. In particular, the
no-arbitrage condition between capital and government bonds must hold:
rt+1 = Rt (10)


































where ￿ is the reserves to deposits ratio.
As pointed out earlier, banks make their portfolio choices taking the ag-
gregate level of economic activity as given. If the economy is at high levels of
capital formation (income), agents are less exposed to liquidity risk. Thus, for
a given interest rate, banks allocate a small fraction of their deposits into cash
reserves. Furthermore, as in standard monetary models, for a given level of
capital, banks demand less cash reserves if the return to money falls relative to
other assets.









which indicates that banks provide little insurance against relocation shocks
when interest rates are high.
2.2 General Equilibrium
I now combine the results of the preceding section and characterize the equilib-
rium for the economy. In equilibrium labor receives its marginal product, (5),
and the labor market clears:
Lt = 1 (14)
8Furthermore, by substituting the money demand equation into the bank￿ s










wt ￿ kt+1 (15)
where kt = Kt in equilibrium. That is, an individual bank￿ s choice of capital
investment is equal to the average level in the banking sector.
On the supply side, using the constant money growth rule, (2), the govern-
ment￿ s budget constraint, (3), and the demand for real money balances, (12),
the supply of bonds by the government must satisfy:










Finally, in equilibrium, the capital market clears when the supply of capital by
banks, (15); is equal to its demand by ￿rms, (4):
Conditions (2), (4), (10), (15), and (16), characterize the behavior of the
economy at each point in time. In this paper, I focus on stationary equilibria.
Thus, I turn to study the behavior of the economy in the steady-state.
2.3 Steady-State Analysis
From the constant money growth rule, (2), the rate of money creation, ￿, is
equal to the rate of in￿ ation,
Pt+1
Pt
in the long run. By imposing steady-state






Denote the amount of government bonds supplied and demanded per unit
of deposits by, ￿
S and ￿







Imposing steady-state on banks￿demand for bonds, (15) :
￿
D = 1 ￿ ￿ (k;R;￿) ￿ ￿(k) (19)
where ￿(k) = k
w(k), is the fraction of deposits allocated towards capital in-









9In this environment, the government is either a net borrower or a net lender.
In particular, for a given in￿ ation tax base, the government is a net borrower
when the real return to government bonds is positive. That is, ￿
S > 0 when
R > 1. Moreover, for a given seigniorage tax base, the government￿ s obligations
are higher as the interest rate on government debt rises. Consequently, the
government lowers its indebtedness. Conversely, the government is a net lender
when the real return to bonds is negative. That is, ￿
S < 0 if R < 1. In contrast
to the previous case, the government￿ s subsidy to the private sector increases
with the return on bonds.
On the demand side, the demand for cash reserves is decreasing in its op-
portunity cost. Therefore, for a given level of capital investment, banks demand
more bonds under higher interest rates.
By imposing equilibrium on the bonds market and using the expression for
wages, (5), we obtain the economy￿ s supply of capital:





From (4) and (10) in the steady state, the inverse demand for capital by ￿rms
can be expressed by:
R = f0 (k) (22)
The steady-state behavior of the economy is characterized by the supply and
demand for capital in the steady state, (21) and (22), respectively.
It is clear that the demand for capital, from (22), is strictly decreasing in R
as shown in Figure 2 below.6 In addition, Proposition 1 describes the behavior
of the supply of capital, (21), in the steady-state:
Lemma 1. The locus de￿ned by (21) satis￿es the following:
a: If R > 1:
i: dR













R ! 1 and lim
k!￿￿1(1)
R ! 1.
b: if R < 1:
i: dR









Lemma 1 demonstrates that the e⁄ects of interest rates on the supply of
capital depend on the net lending position of the government and the level of
economic activity. In particular, suppose the government is a net borrower, with
R > 1. At low levels of output, banks supply less capital under higher interest
6Equation (22), can also be interpreted as a no-arbitrage condition between capital and
government bonds. In this case, the relationship between R and k is explained as follows. A
higher return on government bonds requires a higher return to capital for both assets to be
held simultaneously by banks. This implies that the capital stock must decline.
10rate. In contrast, at high levels of income, equity returns are associated with
higher investment activity. By comparison, if the government is a creditor in
capital markets, interest rates and the level of capital stock are strictly positively
related.
Unlike standard random relocation models, the level of investment by one
￿nancial institution (agent) depends positively on the level of investment by
other ￿nancial institutions. This happens because the higher investment by one
agent reduces the exposure of other agents to liquidity risk. This in turn reduces
the demand for cash reserves and raises capital formation. Therefore, strategic
complementarities from investment in physical capital occur.
Moreover, the portfolio choice by one ￿nancial institution positively a⁄ects
the payo⁄s by other banks. In particular, a higher level of investment activity
by one bank raises the aggregate level of capital, which reduces the exposure of
agents to risk. Since the population size is unity, a lower probability of relocation
also implies a smaller number agents who relocate. Thus, other banks make
smaller payments to their depositors (as a group) who relocate. As a result,
there are positive spillovers from capital accumulation in this framework.7
Due to the presence of strategic complementarities, there are two levels of
capital that clear the bonds market for a given positive interest rate, as illus-
trated in Figure 1 below. Therefore, a given return to equity can be associated
with two di⁄erent levels of capital supplied by banks. The intuition is as follows.
The supply of capital, (21), re￿ ects combinations of R and k that clear the
bonds market. As a benchmark, consider an environment such as Schreft and
Smith (1997), where the degree of liquidity risk does not vary with the level of
economic activity. In their setting, the in￿ ation tax base is independent from
economic activity. Hence, the supply of bonds per unit of deposits does not
vary with the level of income. Moreover, the fraction of deposits allocated into
government bonds is inversely related with the level of investment. That is,
at higher levels of capital formation, banks allocate a smaller fraction of their
deposits into bonds to satisfy their balance sheets. Consequently, there exists a
unique value of k for a given R that clears the bonds market.
By comparison, for a given return on bonds, R = R0 > 1, the supply of
government debt is strictly declining in the level of economic activity in this
setting. Speci￿cally, at high levels of capital formation, say kA, the probability
of liquidity shock is low. Therefore, the demand for cash in the economy is
relatively small. The low amount of seigniorage revenue results in a low supply
of government debt. Moreover, banks allocate a small fraction of their deposits
into government bonds. Thus, the bonds market clears at a point like A in




kA denote the demand and supply of bonds,
respectively at kA.
In contrast, the degree of liquidity risk is signi￿cant at low levels of capital
formation such as kB < kA. As a result, banks hold a lot of cash reserves in
their portfolios. Since seigniorage revenue is high, the supply of bonds is high
7Please refer to Cooper and John (1988) for additional information on spillovers and strate-
gic complementarities.
11as well. Consequently, the bond market also clears at point B as shown in the
Figure.
Interestingly, the above analysis suggests that for a given interest rate, banks￿
portfolios at low levels of income consist mainly of cash reserves and govern-
ment bonds (￿ + ￿). In contrast, banks at higher levels of economic activity
devote more resources towards capital formation and less towards government
liabilities.
Figure 1: Bonds Market Equilibrium
In addition, the level of economic activity plays a signi￿cant role in deter-
mining the relationship between the return on capital and the supply of capital
by banks. To better understand the e⁄ects of in￿ ation on banks￿portfolios, it is
useful to refer to the condition for optimal money holding, (23). A bank chooses





u0 (cm) = Ru0 (cn) (23)
where cm and cn are the consumption of a mover and a non-mover, respectively.
In addition, the term on the left-hand side of (23) re￿ ects the bene￿t from
holding one additional unit of money. Additionally, the term on the right hand
side is marginal cost of holding cash. The cost of holding one unit of money is
12equal to the return to alternative investments times the loss in utility to non-
movers from holding one extra unit of currency (one less unit of other assets).















For a given portfolio choice, a change in the return to capital has two e⁄ects
on asset allocation. First, a higher return to capital raises the cost of hold-
ing money directly. Further, the supply of capital incorporates the supply of
bonds by the government. Speci￿cally, it takes into account the reaction by
the government to changes in interest rates. Thus, banks adjust their portfolios
to conditions in the bonds market. For instance, suppose the government is a
net borrower. Under a higher real interest rate, the government lowers its in-
debtedness. The lower amount of bonds in the economy translates into a lower
consumption to non-movers (1 ￿ ￿ = ￿ + ￿). Due to a higher marginal utility
from consumption to non-movers, the cost of holding money increases. In this
manner, higher interest rates indirectly raise the cost of holding money through
the government￿ s budget.
If banks are unable to in￿ uence the exposure to risk, banks respond to a
higher cost of holding money by holding less of it. By doing so, movers receive
a lower consumption and utility is maximized.
Interestingly, the above mechanism does not necessarily hold if the degree
of liquidity risk depends on the aggregate level of investment. As shown earlier,
there are two levels of capital that clear the bonds market for a given interest
rate. At low levels of capital formation, k < e k, the degree of liquidity risk is
signi￿cant. Therefore, banks hold a lot of cash reserves to insure their depositors
against risk. From (1), the probability of relocation is highly sensitive to changes
in the amount of capital accumulation. In response to a lower consumption to
non-movers, banks collectively choose to raise the value of money by raising
the probability of relocation. That is, banks invest less in capital. By raising
the probability of relocation, the marginal utility of movers is higher and the
expected utility of depositors is maximized. Thus, the capital supply curve is
downward sloping for all k < e k as illustrated in Figure 2 below. In addition,
from (19), this also implies that the amount of government liabilities in banks￿
portfolio is increasing with the interest rate in poor economies.
In contrast, at high levels of capital, k > e k, individuals are less susceptible
to liquidity risk. Further, changes in the stock of capital have little impact on
the value of money. In response to a higher cost of holding money, banks raise
their capital investment. In turn, the supply curve of capital slopes upward in
economies with large amount of resources. Further, ￿nancial intermediaries in
these economies hold less government liabilities in their portfolios under higher
interest rates.
By comparison, when the government is a net lender, the amount of sub-
sidy provided by the government to the private sector increases with interest
rates. Moreover, the degree of liquidity risk is not signi￿cant. Consequently,the
13amount of capital supplied by banks increases under a higher return to bonds.
Figure 2: Steady-State Equilibria
I proceed by studying existence of steady-state equilibria where money is
dominated in rate of return, R > 1
￿.













. For two steady states, the government is a net borrower (R > 1)
and for the other steady state, the government is a net lender (R < 1). In
contrast, there are exactly two steady-states with R > 1 if ￿ < ￿0.
An equilibrium in which the government is a net borrower requires that (21)
and (22) intersect at R > 1 as illustrated in Figure 2 above. This happens if the
degree of liquidity risk is not too signi￿cant. Thus, the lowest real interest rate
associated with banks￿supply of capital is no too high. Under this condition,
there are always two steady states in which the government is a net borrower. In
particular, the ￿rst steady-state, A1; is characterized with a low capital stock,
high real interest rates, and a high degree of liquidity risk. Alternatively, the
14other steady-state, B1; has a higher capital stock, a lower real interest rate, and
a lower exposure to liquidity risk.
Moreover, the supply and demand for capital also intersect at R < 1, but
the steady steady state may not be feasible since money may not be dominated
in rate of return. As indicated in the proposition, a steady-state where the
government is a net lender exists if the rate of return to money (in￿ ation) is
signi￿cantly low (high). If this condition does not hold, equilibrium C1 is not
feasible and there are exactly two steady-states where the government is a net
borrower.
Since governments primarily incur budget de￿cits, I focus my attention on
equilibria with positive interest rates. I proceed to discuss the impact of a higher
rate of money growth on the supply of capital, (21).
Lemma 2. Suppose k < ~ k. De￿ne b RA and b kA : 1





b kA; b RA;￿
￿￿
.
If R ￿ (<) b RA, @k
@￿ ￿ (>)0. In contrast, suppose k > ~ k. De￿ne b RB and
b kB : 1





b kB; b RB;￿
￿￿
, with b RA > b RB and b kA < b kB. If
R ￿ (<) b RB, @k
@￿ ￿ (<)0.
The e⁄ects of in￿ ation on banks￿portfolios may be better understood by
referring to a bank￿ s optimal choice of money balances, (23). In this setting,
monetary policy a⁄ects banks￿portfolios through two primary channels. First,
for a given real interest rate, a higher rate of money growth directly lowers
the return to money relative to other assets. This results in lower payments to
relocated agents and therefore a lower bene￿t from holding cash. I refer to this
e⁄ect as the price channel.
Additionally, monetary policy in￿ uences banks￿ balance sheets indirectly
through the government￿ s budget. Speci￿cally, a higher rate of money creation
raises the ability of the government to issue debt (or loans when R < 1). The
higher amount of debt reduces resources in banks￿portfolios that can be devoted
towards alternative assets. In addition, a higher amount of debt implies a higher
consumption to agents who do not relocate. Therefore, a lower cost of holding
money. I refer to this e⁄ect as the balance sheet channel.
Interestingly, the impact of each channel on capital investment depends on
the degree of liquidity risk and the level of economic activity. I ￿rst examine
the price channel of monetary policy at di⁄erent levels of income.
At low levels of capital formation (income), agents are highly exposed to
liquidity risk. Thus, banks hold highly liquid portfolios. Consequently, a higher
in￿ ation rate signi￿cantly reduces the bene￿ts from holding cash reserves. Fur-
ther, the probability of relocation is highly sensitive to changes in the level of
investment. Rather than holding less cash to raise the value money, banks col-
lectively choose to reduce their capital investment. By doing so, they raise their
depositors￿exposure to risk and the bene￿t from holding money.
In contrast to poor countries, the degree of liquidity risk is not signi￿cant
in advanced economies. Because the need for cash is not signi￿cant, the bene￿t
15from holding it is slightly a⁄ected by a higher rate of money growth. Therefore,
banks respond to a lower value of money by holding less of it and by raising
their investment in physical capital.
I proceed to examine the balance sheet channel of monetary policy for a given
interest rate. At low levels of income, agents receive little consumption in the
event they do not relocate. Therefore, the cost of holding money is signi￿cant
and falls drastically when the amount of bonds in banks portfolios increases. As
the probability of relocation is highly sensitive to changes in the capital stock,
banks respond to a lower cost of holding money by jointly choosing to hold more
capital to reduce their depositors￿exposure to risk. By doing so, banks are able
to substantially reduce the amount of money holding in their portfolios. Thus,
they can acquire the additional debt issued by the government without lowering
their capital investments.
By comparison, banks hold little amounts of cash reserves in their portfo-
lios at high levels of development. Due to high levels of capital investment,
non-movers also receive high levels of consumption. Consequently, the cost of
holding money slightly falls due to the higher amount of debt in the economy.
Banks respond to a lower cost of holding money by holding more of it. In these
economies, government debt crowds out capital formation.
In sum, for a given R, the net impact of monetary policy on the supply of
capital depends on which e⁄ect dominates at di⁄erent levels of income. Specif-
ically, if the price e⁄ect dominates, banks supply less (more) capital under a
higher rate of money growth in poor (rich) countries. In contrast, banks sup-
ply more (less) capital under a higher ￿ if the balance sheet e⁄ect dominates
in poor (rich) economies. Interestingly, the price e⁄ect dominates if the real
interest rate is above some threshold level as illustrated in Figure 3 below.
Intuitively, from (13), non-movers receive a relatively higher rate of return
under a higher R. The higher consumption by non-movers renders banks￿bal-
ance sheets less sensitive to changes in the amount of government debt. Thus,
when government debt increases under a higher rate of money growth, its mar-
ginal impact through the balance sheet channel weakens. There exists a real
interest rate, above which the price e⁄ect dominates. As I demonstrate in the
appendix, the threshold level of interest for poor economies, b RA, is much higher
than that in advanced countries, b RB.
16Figure 3: E⁄ects of Monetary Policy on the Supply of Capital
As emphasized in the discussion of Lemma 1, the amount of government li-
abilities in banks portfolios is relatively large in economies with low levels of in-
come,
￿
k < e k
￿
. Moreover, banks supply less capital under higher interest rates.
From (19), this also implies that the amount of government liabilities in banks￿
portfolio is increasing with the interest rate in poor economies. Consequently,
Lemma 2 suggests that an in￿ ationary monetary policy adversely a⁄ects capital
formation in poor countries when the amount of government liabilities in banks￿
portfolios is signi￿cantly large. In contrast, monetary policy generates a Tobin
e⁄ect if the amount of government liabilities is relatively small.
By comparison, banks supply more capital under higher interest rate in
high income countries,
￿
k > e k
￿
. Hence, ￿nancial intermediaries allocate less re-
sources towards government liabilities. The condition in Lemma 2 indicates that
banks supply more capital under a higher rate of money growth if the amount
of government liabilities in their portfolios is relatively small. In contrast, banks
reduce their investment in physical capital under higher in￿ ation rates if their
portfolios contain a substantial amount of government liabilities.
17The work above suggests that the e⁄ects of monetary policy should vary
at each steady-state. In the following proposition, I present a condition under
which the results in the data are obtained.











this condition, in￿ation adversely a⁄ects capital formation at the low-capital
steady-state. In contrast, in￿ation generates a Tobin e⁄ect at the economy with
a high level of economic activity.
Figure 4 depicts the e⁄ects of a higher rate of money growth on each steady-
state. As demonstrated in Lemma 2, a higher rate of money growth promotes
capital formation in advanced economies, k > e k, if the return to capital exceeds
some threshold, b RB. Since interest rates are higher at the low capital economy,
it is su¢ cient that the price e⁄ect dominates at the high-capital economy, B1.
This happens if at b RB, there is an excess demand for capital. The rate of money
growth, ￿, is such that b RB equals the real interest rate at the high capital
economy (capital market is in equilibrium). As I demonstrate in the appendix,
b RB is falling in ￿. Therefore, for all ￿ > ￿ there is an excess demand for capital.
This guarantees that the price e⁄ect dominates at both steady-states.
18Figure 4: E⁄ects of Monetary Policy on Steady-State Equilibria
Intuitively, when the rate of return to money balances is low, movers receive
little consumption in the event they relocate. The low consumption by movers
renders banks￿balance sheets highly sensitive to changes in rates of return.
Thus, the price e⁄ect dominates the balance sheet e⁄ects under a higher rate of
money growth.
At low levels of income, individuals are signi￿cantly exposed to liquidity risk.
However, ￿nancial markets are highly distorted as banks provide inadequate
amount of insurance to their depositors. Moreover, banks allocate a signi￿cant
fraction of their depositors towards government liabilities. In￿ ation exacerbates
these problems by adversely a⁄ecting capital formation.
In contrast to poor countries, resources are allocated more e¢ ciently in ad-
vanced economies. Due to higher levels of income, people are less exposed to
liquidity risk. Consequently, banks allocate a small fraction of their deposits to-
wards less productive assets. In these economies, a higher rate of money creation
will most likely promote capital formation as long as the amount of government
liabilities is relatively small.
193 Conclusions
Recent evidence points out to an asymmetric relationship between in￿ ation and
the level of economic activity across countries. In poor economies, in￿ ation
is associated with low levels of output. In contrast, in￿ ation and output are
positively correlated in advanced countries. Recent work by Ghossoub and
Reed (2009) attribute these asymmetries to the large di⁄erences in the degree
of exposure liquidity risk across countries. In this paper, I demonstrate that the
portfolio composition of ￿nancial institutions also has signi￿cant implications
for monetary policy at all levels of development. For a given level of development
a higher rate of money growth adversely a⁄ects capital formation if the amount
of government liabilities in banks portfolios is above some threshold level. In
contrast, investment activity increases under a higher in￿ ation rate if the amount
of government liabilities in banks portfolios is relatively low.
In this manuscript, I provide a condition under which the results in the data
hold. In less developed economies, ￿nancial intermediation is highly distorted by
high interest rates. Because agents are highly exposed to liquidity risk, govern-
ment liabilities crowd out capital formation in banks￿portfolios. Consequently,
a higher rate of money creation inhibits capital formation in these countries.
In contrast, agents are less exposed to liquidity risk in advanced countries and
￿nancial markets are less distorted. Further, banks invest a large fraction of
their deposits in capital formation. As a result, monetary policy generates a
Tobin e⁄ect.
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214 Technical Appendix
1. Proof of Lemma 1. De￿ne S (R;￿) ￿
R￿ 1
￿
(R￿1). The supply of capital, (21)
is expressed as:
S (R;￿)￿ (k;R;￿) = 1 ￿ ￿(k) (25)













It is easy to verify that
@S(R;￿)
@R < 0, therefore, the denominator is negative.
Thus, the sign of dR
dk , depends on the sign of the term in the numerator. In
particular, dR
dk ￿ (<)0 if ￿￿0 (k) ￿ S (R;￿)
@￿(k;R;￿)
@k ￿ (>)0. Thus, dR
dk = 0 if
￿￿0 (k) ￿ S (R;￿)
@￿(k;R;￿)







Further, using (21), dR









It is easy to verify from (27) that for a given R = e R > 1, there exists a unique




such that (27) holds and dR
dk = 0. In addition for all
k < (>)e k, the numerator is positive (negative) and dR
dk < (>)0. Finally, from
(26), dR
dk > 0 for all R < 1 as S (R;￿) < 0. This completes the proof of Lemma
1.
2. Proof of Proposition 1. As pointed out in the next, two conditions
for existence must be satis￿ed. First, when the government is a net borrower,
the supply and demand curves must intersect. This happens if the in￿ ection
point of (21) lies above (22). Thus, at e k, the real interest rate that satis￿es the




, must exceed the return that satis￿es the supply of




. By de￿nition of ~ k, (27) and some algebra,







































In equilibrium, money must be dominated in rate of return. Therefore, all
equilibria must occur above the R = 1
￿ line. When the government is a net
22borrower, R > 1, this condition is automatically satis￿ed. Thus, there are
always two steady-states in which the government is a net borrower, as long
as the condition derived above holds. Next, we need to ￿nd conditions such
that the steady-state with R < 1 exists. This happens if (21) and (22) intersect
above the R = 1
￿ line as in Figure 2. This happens if there is an excess demand
for capital at R = 1
￿.
At R = 1



















. Therefore, for all ￿ > ￿, money
is dominated in rate of return when the government is a net lender. This
completes the proof of Proposition 1.
3. Proof of Lemma 2. Taking the derivative of (21) with respect to ￿,





@￿ ￿ (k;R;￿) + S (R;￿)
@￿(k;R;￿)
@￿




From Lemma 1, we know that for all k < ~ k, ￿S (R;￿)
@￿(k;R;￿)
@k ￿ ￿0 (k) > 0
and for all k ￿ ~ k, ￿S (R;￿)
@￿(k;R;￿)
@k ￿ ￿0 (k) ￿ 0. Next, we need to sign
the term in the numerator of (28). Speci￿cally, @k
@￿ = 0 if
@S(R;￿)
@￿ ￿ (k;R;￿) +
S (R;￿)
@￿(k;R;￿)





















￿ (1 ￿ ￿). This polynomial can be expressed as:
  (k;R) ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿ ￿(k;R) = 0 (29)
where ￿(k;R) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(R￿ ￿ 1).








k ! 1. Below (above) the   (k;R) = 0 lo-












. For all R < b R, ￿
1￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(R￿ ￿ 1) >
0 and the numerator of (28) is positive. In contrast, for all R ￿ b R, the numer-
ator of (28) is negative. Finally, it is clear that b R is strictly increasing in k.
Therefore, I denote b RA and b RB to be the values of R satisfying (21) such that
@k
@￿ = 0 at k < ~ k and k > ~ k, respectively. Clearly, at R = b RB > e R, there are
two values of k solving (21). Denote the roots of (21) at R = b RB by k and b kB,
with k < b kB. This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
4. Proof of Proposition 2. As emphasized in the text, the price e⁄ect
dominates if a steady-state equilibrium occurs above the R = b R line. This
23holds at the steady-state with high economic activity, B if at b RB, there is an
excess demand for capital. As explained above, b kB is the maximum amount
of capital supplied when R = b RB. On the other hand, the demand for capital













(29), it is easy to verify that for a given stock of capital, b R is decreasing in ￿.







. An excess demand for capital at R = b RB occurs if ￿ > ￿.
This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
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